Arthur Bradley, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary Literature and Critical Theory at Lancaster University, has written Originary Technicity as a. Life — Labour — Psyche — Being — The other — Time — Death. Arthur Bradley, Originary Technicity: The Theory of Technology from Marx to Predication as Originary Violence: A Phenomenological Critique of Derrida’s View.

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This is accomplished via: For Kant, this human capacity to see organic life as organised purpo- sively or teleologically in terms of ends is what he calls the ‘technic of nature’: However, it is only because man has the natural capacity to set him- self ends that he is able to see nature as end-driven at all: Jacques Lacan’s so-called ‘materialist definition of consciousness’ in his Seminar II: Refresh and try again.

Where does it come from? Yet, in spite of such differences, I will ask whether it still remains possible to detect a residual anthropocentrism – both explicit and implicit – across the entire spectrum of posthumanist theory.

Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Finally, and tecnnicity notoriously, Marx also defines the machine as the logical conclusion of the capitalisation of production: On the one side, we have neo-transcendentalists like Hans Moravec for whom technogenesis will ultimately realise the Cartesian dream of a disem- bodied, post-organic virtual consciousness.

On the other side, however, we have artifice, finitude, death, the empirical and something called ‘technology’. According to Oriiginary, what is taking place when the cam – era automatically records the image of the mountain in the lake is nothing less than a phenomenon of consciousness: Now, if memory simply does not possess the quasi-mystical powers of infinite, spontaneous reproduction that Freud attributes to it, then this means that it is already m technickty closer to the allegedly inert, finite and non-spontaneous machine than he allows.

Arthur Bradley, Originary Technicity: The Theory of Technology From Marx to Derrida – PhilPapers

Whereas the conventional wisdom insisted that human beings evolved a larger brain three or four times the size of that of a chimpanzee and then used it to develop human culture, Leroi-Gouhran turns this logic on its head: As Canguilhem points out in his study of the machine metaphor, the organism is always compared to a preconceived and often very limited idea of the machine – life- less, mechanical, prosthetic – rather than the machine being compared to the living, autonomous and self-forming organism ‘Machine and Organism’, p.

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For the later Heidegger, of course, the ‘essence’ Wesen of technology is famously nothing to do with ontic or empirical technology itself so much as with what he calls the Gestell that constitutes the dominant revelation of Being in the epoch of technoscience: Despite the fact that much of the Dialectics belongs to the realm of historical curios- ity today, it is remarkable that Engels’ almost entirely speculative thesis on the origins of man still manages to anticipate many of the theories of modern palaeo-anthropology, particularly Leroi-Gouhran’s argument about the role of tool use in human evolution.

Basic Questions o f Philosophy, pp. Spirits in the Material World: For Freud, in other words, what is taking place here is a classic gesture of techno- logical abjection: But let us take it to the point of supposing that all living beings have disappeared.

Hansen objects, ‘it simply cannot be extended to cover the category of modern production’: The image in the mirror – the image in the lake – do they still exist? W hat happens, then, when we re-visit the Marxian critique of the machine in the light of his theory of the technological condition of the human itself? Heather Bloor marked it as to-read Mar 16, By recalling and adapting Agamben’s claim that ‘man has no specific identity other than the ability to recognise himself’ The Open, p.

To state it very simply, I wish to argue that the theory of originary technicity from Marx to Derrida is – despite its claims to the con- trary – not technical all the way down. And it is in the dream machine that he rediscovers what was there all along and which hadn’t been noticed, namely, that it is at the most organic and most simple, most immediate and least manageable level, at the most unconscious level, that sense and speech are revealed and blossom forth in their entirety, p.

Now, as Derrida goes on to show in his classic essay ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’,2 we can arguably extend the analogy with writing further, by attending to the vital role of difference in Freud’s model of the psyche. For all its originality, though, psychoanalysis also pursues and extends a classically Cartesian thought experiment about the relation between the organic and the mechanical: If I do seek to represent many of the dominant trends within continental thought over the last 1 0 0 years – Marxian historical materialism; psychoanalysis; fundamental ontology; phenomenology; deconstruction; genealogy – my selective approach results in some important and inevitably rather arbitrary omis- sions as well: W hat, then, exactly is the function of machines in Freud’s account of the Uncanny – metaphors for mind, materialisations of infantile dread or something else?


The Jewish Question Revisited: This chapter explores Marx’s originaryy of technology from the anthropology articulated in early works like oriyinary Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts to the theory of labour propounded in the Capital before concluding with the famous critique of machines in the Grundrisse.

The supposedly extraneous technological sup- plement exposes a lack – an originary difference, spacing or deferral of presence – within the alleged state of nature that it supplements.

Arthur Bradley, Originary Technicity: The Theory of Technology from Marx to Derrida

It becomes possible, in the light of such a conclusion, to imagine a Marxian materialist genealogy rather than a simple anthropology of the human where, as Amy Wendling notes, ‘the embodiment of different forms of tools produces different types of human being’ Marx on Technology and Alienation, p.

Skip to main content. In the Greek world, phusis ultimately precedes the dis- tinction between nature and technics: Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. If Simondon attacks hylomorphism by offering a new phenomenology of technological evolution, in other words, Leroi-Gouhran’s own critique takes the form of a new, and quite literally bottom-up, anthropology.

Just as Freud brings back the ego when he defines the Uncanny as the awareness that consciousness is machinic, so Lacan, in turn, is forced to re-introduce some quasi-egoised phenomenon that is able to reflect upon consciousness-as-machine.

originayr There must be a super-added phenomenon for which the photographic image has a meaning – which is able to apprehend its status as a wit- ness to a real object – and ‘consciousness’ is as good a name for that phenomenon as any other. If Dasein’s hammer does not break down, however, then it never becomes an object in its own right but remains an invisible and indivisible part of the open-ended world of everyday involvements in which Dasein is unreflectively absorbed: It is true, too, that once the writing has been erased, the Mystic Pad cannot ‘reproduce’ it from within; it would be a mystic pad indeed if, like our memory, it could accomplish that.