ISO/IEC. Third edition. Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security —. Part 2: Security functional. ISO/IEC (E). PDF disclaimer. This PDF file may contain embedded typefaces. In accordance with Adobe’s licensing policy, this file. The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation is an international standard (ISO/IEC ) for computer security certification.
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Views Read Edit View history. Common Criteria certification cannot guarantee security, but it can ensure that claims about the security attributes of the evaluated product were independently verified.
If any of these security vulnerabilities are exploitable in the product’s evaluated configuration, the product’s Common Criteria certification should be voluntarily withdrawn by the vendor. The compliance izo ISO is typically demonstrated to a National approval authority:. CC was produced by unifying these pre-existing standards, predominantly so that companies selling computer products for the government market mainly for Defence or Intelligence use would only need to have them evaluated against one set of standards.
Vendors can then implement or make claims about the security attributes of their products, and testing laboratories can evaluate the products to determine if they actually meet the claims. This is possible because the process of obtaining a Common Criteria 51408-2 allows a vendor to restrict the analysis to certain security features and to make certain assumptions about the operating environment and the strength of threats faced by the product in that environment.
Although some have argued that both paradigms do not align well,  others have attempted to reconcile both paradigms. ISO standards by standard number. 154008-2 this approach, communities of interest form around technology types which in turn develop protection profiles that define the evaluation methodology for the technology type.
The UK has also produced a number of alternative schemes when the timescales, costs and overheads of mutual recognition have been found to be impeding the operation of the market:. The United States currently only allows PP-based evaluations. Various Microsoft Windows versions, including Windows Server and Windows XPhave been certifiedbut security patches to address security vulnerabilities are still getting published by Microsoft for these Windows systems.
Additionally, the CC recognizes a need lso limit the scope of evaluation in order to provide cost-effective and useful security certifications, such that evaluated products are examined to a level of detail specified uso the assurance level or PP. Wheeler suggested that 154088-2 Common Criteria process iiso against free and open-source software FOSS -centric ido and development models.
More recently, PP authors are including cryptographic requirements for CC evaluations that would typically be covered by FIPS evaluations, broadening the bounds of the CC through scheme-specific interpretations.
It is currently 1408-2 version 3. Retrieved from ” https: From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. In contrast, much Isl software is 154082 using modern agile paradigms. Archived from the original PDF on April 17, This shows 15408-22 the limitation and strength of an evaluated configuration. This will be achieved through technical working groups developing worldwide PPs, and as yet a transition period has not been fully determined.
In Septembera majority of members of the CCRA produced a vision statement whereby mutual recognition of CC evaluated products will be lowered to EAL 2 Including augmentation with flaw remediation.
Whether you run Microsoft Windows in the precise evaluated configuration or not, you should apply Microsoft’s security patches for the vulnerabilities in Windows as they continue to appear. Alternatively, the vendor should re-evaluate the product to include the application of patches to fix the security vulnerabilities within the evaluated configuration. Some national evaluation schemes are phasing out EAL-based evaluations and only accept products for evaluation that claim strict conformance with an approved PP.
Failure by the vendor to take either of these steps would result in involuntary withdrawal of the product’s certification by the certification body of the country in which the product was evaluated. Evaluations at EAL5 and above tend to involve the security requirements of the host nation’s government. Computer security standards Evaluation of computers ISO standards.
Standard ISO/IEC 15408, CC v3.1. Release 4
Webarchive template wayback links Interlanguage link template link number. Key elements of the Vision included:. There is some concern that this may have a negative impact on mutual recognition.
In other words, Common Criteria provides assurance that the process of specification, implementation and evaluation of a computer security product has been conducted in a rigorous and standard and repeatable manner at a level that is commensurate with the target environment for use. As well as the Common Criteria standard, there is also a sub-treaty level Common Criteria MRA Mutual Recognition Arrangementwhereby each party thereto recognizes evaluations against the Common Criteria standard done by other parties.
Evaluations activities are therefore only performed to a certain depth, use of time, and resources and offer reasonable assurance for the intended environment. Common Criteria is very generic; it does not directly provide a list of product security requirements or features for specific classes of products: Characteristics of these organizations were examined and presented at ICCC Thus they should only be considered secure in iwo assumed, specified circumstances, also known as the evaluated configuration.
This page was last edited on 6 Decemberat Major changes to the Arrangement include:.
Standard ISO/IEC , CC v Release 4
Other standards containing, e. Further, this vision indicates a move away from assurance levels altogether and evaluations will be confined to conformance with Protection Profiles that have no stated assurance level. Archived from the original on August 1, Canada is in the process of phasing out EAL-based evaluations. Instead, national standards, like FIPS give the specifications for cryptographic modules, and various standards specify the cryptographic algorithms in use.
In other words, products evaluated against a Common Criteria standard exhibit a clear chain of evidence that the process of specification, implementation, and evaluation has been conducted in a rigorous and standard manner.
Common Criteria certification is sometimes specified for IT procurement. In Sept ofthe Common Criteria published a Vision Statement implementing to a large extent Chris Salter’s thoughts from the previous year.
Objections outlined in the article include:.
The evaluation process also tries to establish the level of confidence that may be placed in the product’s security features through quality assurance processes:. In a research paper, computer specialist David A.
The TOE is applicable to networked or distributed environments only if the entire network operates under the same constraints and resides within a single management domain.
There are no security requirements that address the need to trust external systems or the communications links to sio systems.