based argument in “Autonomy, toleration, and the harm principle. excluding it is one of the goals of Joseph Raz’s autonomy-based argument in “Autonomy. Joseph Raz aligns practices with harms in a different way w person who fails to See “Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle,” in Issue. Philosophy, ed. First, it is essential for the concept of toleration that the tolerated beliefs .. Raz, J. , , “Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle,” in S.

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Two Auhonomy According to QuongRaz is committed to the following theses: Gray himself, however, in the second edition of his book, comes to the conclusion that the reconciliation cannot succeed.

Earlier another strand of thinking about the limits holeration the law, that the law must remain neutral between different understandings of the nature of the good, was briefly noted.

There does indeed seem on the face of it to be something special about harm.

The Limits of Law (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Spring Edition)

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Preventing people from pursuing bad princople is in principle consistent with the value of autonomy, since autonomy is only valuable insofar as ths is spent in pursuit of good options.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian. I think, therefore, that it is not possible to set theoretical limits to the power of the State to legislate against immorality.

Toleration (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The first ane requires an assessment of the conflicts that require and allow for toleration, given the history and character of the groups involved; and the second requires an adequate and convincing normative justification of toleration in a given social context. First, one might say his legislation is inadmissible because it is not based on public reason.

Let us take these considerations in turn.


Even though they th fundamentally in their ethical beliefs about the good and true way of life and in their cultural practices, citizens recognize one another as moral-political equals in the sense that their common framework of social life should—as far as fundamental questions of rights and liberties and the distribution of resources are concerned—be guided by tolration that all parties can equally accept and that do not favor one specific ethical or cultural community cf.

If this objection component cf. And it may stop A from stealing from B, as it protects inter alia B’s freedom to dispose of his property as he wishes. Raz is well aware that coercion will not always impinge seriously on a person’s autonomy. Similar to Augustine, Thomas Aquinas later developed a number of reasons for limited and conditional toleration, drawing especially strong limits against tolerating any form of heresy. Can the coercion-based account be discriminating enough to do the job for which it is intended?

And such principles of moral respect and of reciprocity cannot be trumped by religious truths, according to Bayle, for reasonable religious faith is aware that ultimately it is based on personal faith and trust, not on apprehensions of objective truth.

Quongquoting Raz. They prefer peaceful coexistence to conflict and agree to a reciprocal compromise, to a certain modus vivendi. Adopting a value-pluralist notion of morality, he argues in short that even though:. Many, however, challenge the autinomy view and assert there is something in the nature of human morality itself that should lead us to conclude that principled limits to the law do exist.

Why should coercion not be used to eliminate repugnant options?

But coercing against harmless principe gives one an autonomy-loss, due to the coercion itself, which puts the account in debit, with no positive gain in autonomy to counterbalance the loss. Toleration towards opinions is justified by the utilitarian consideration that not just true, but also false opinions lead to productive social learning processes.

Toleration then means that the authority gives qualified permission to the minority to live according to their beliefs on condition that the minority accepts the dominant position of the authority or majority.


A state may also need to consider in some contexts the psychology of its citizens. Abailard and Raimundus Lullus wrote inter-religious dialogues searching for ways of defending the truth of Christian faith while also seeing some truth—religious or at least ethical—in other religions. The relation of tolerance is no longer vertical but horizontal: There can in Nagel’s view be values that, while true or valid, are inadmissible from the point of view of the coercee.

We turn to that in a moment.


For them, the preservation of political sovereignty took primacy over the preservation of religious unity, and toleration was recommended as a superior policy in a situation of religious plurality and strife.

The former he describes thus:. Principles of liberal toleration are best, or most plausibly, justified by appealing to the intrinsic or inherent value of leading an autonomous life.

In important respects, this is a more radical theory than the much more popular and influential one developed by Locke, who distinguishes between state and church in an early liberal perspective of natural individual rights. His central claim is that the harm principle is defensible on the basis of the principle of autonomy for one simple reason: It is, however, wrong to conclude from this that the tolerant need to be in a position to effectively prohibit or interfere with the tolerated practices, for a minority that does not have this power may very well be tolerant in holding the view that if it had such power, it would not use it to suppress other parties cf.

Law must seek to do the best possible with the tools available.